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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 981888-CA

v.
ALAN KIHLSTROM,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction forgery, a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (Supp. 1999), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Pat B. Brian, presiding. This Court has
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion to dismiss at the close of
the State's case-in-chief? The appellate court will uphold a trial court's decision to
submit a case to the jury if, "upon reviewing the evidence and all inferences that can be
reasonably drawn from it, [the court] conclude[s] that some evidence exists from which a
reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt." State v. Davis, 965 P.2d 525, 535 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State

v. Dibello. 780 P.3d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989)).
2. Did the trial court properly give jury instruction #22, which, along with other
jury instructions, defined for the jury a "purpose to defraud"? "[The appellate court]
review[s] jury instructions under a correctness standard, granting no particular deference
to the trial court." State v. Stringham. 957 P.2d 602, 608 (Utah App. 1998) (citations
omitted). "Also, '[the appellate court] review[s] jury instructions in their entirety to
determine whether the instructions, taken as a whole, fairly instruct the jury on the
applicable law.'" Id. (citation omitted).
3. Did the prosecutor's unsupported suggestion that defendant was avoiding the
police and the prosecutor's mistaken assertion that defendant had testified to receiving
only one rather two stolen checks constitute prosecutorial misconduct? On appeal, the
reviewing court undertakes an independent review to determine whether the prosecutor's
remarks "called to the jurors' attention matters which they would not be justified in
considering in reaching a verdict" and were prejudicial. State v. Taylor, 884 P.2d 1293,
1296 (Utah App. 1994)(citation omitted). Where a defendant fails to object to improper
remarks, the appellate court may review the claim of misconduct for plain error. See
State v. Emmett 839 P.2d 781, 785 (Utah 1992); State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 342
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). Plain error is found if the court concludes: "an error exists, it
should have been obvious to the trial court, and it was harmful." Palmer, 860 P.2d at 342.
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. 76-6-501 (Supp. 1999) - Forgery - "Writing" defined.
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with
knowledge that he is facilitating afraudto be perpetrated by anyone, he:
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters
any such altered writing; or
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues,
transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or
the making, completion, execution, authentication, issuance,
transference, publication or utterance purports to be the act of
another, whether the person is existent or nonexistent, or
purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a
numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a
copy of an original when no such original existed.
(2) As used in this section, "writing" includes printing, electronic storage or
transmission, or any other method of recording valuable information
including forms such as:
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges,
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of value, right,
privilege, or identification;
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or
writing issued by a government or any agency; or
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other instrument
or writing representing an interest in or claim against
property, or a pecuniary interest in or claim against any
person or enterprise.
(3) Forgery is a felony of the third degree.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Alan Kihlstrom, was charged with forgery (R. 4-6). A jury found him
guilty as charged (R. 94). The trial court sentenced him to a statutory zero-to-five year
term in the Utah State Prison and ordered him to pay restitution (R. 102-03). Defendant
filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 106).
3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the fall of 1996 Furst Construction ("Furst"), located in West Valley City,
discovered checks from its 18,000 series had been stolen when unauthorized checks
began appearing on the company's bank statement (R. 125:97-98). Within a two-month
period approximately twelve of the stolen checks were drawn on Furst's account (R.
125:98). Furst notified the police, stopped payment on all checks in the 18,000 series,
and closed the bank account on which the checks were being drawn (R. 125: 98-99).
In early April 1997, defendant presented a check for $1,346.28 to Karl Anderson,
an employee at Bill's Lounge in Magna, and requested that the check be cashed (R.
124:9, 33, State's Ex. 1). The check, numbered 18871 and dated April 2, 1997, was from
Furst. It was one of the stolen checks and the basis for the forgery charge (R. 4-5, 125:97,
99). The check was made payable to "Kilstrom, Alan" and had a typewritten post office
box address in Gillette, Wyoming (R. 124: 9, State's Ex. 1). As identification, defendant
presented a Wyoming commercial driver's license which listed the same post office box
address as on the check (R. 124:9-10, 35, 40-41). Defendant, however, had not lived in
Wyoming for more than five years (R. 124:42). Defendant later testified that giving his
Wyoming post office box, instead of his current address in Magna, "saves me a lot of
problems" in verifying his identification (R. 124:43). Defendant admitted providing an
incorrect spelling to a Mike Workman, the individual from whom defendant allegedly
received the check (R. 124:43-44).
4

Following normal procedures, Anderson wrote the commercial driver's license
number and defendant's social security number on the check (R. 124:9-10). Also in
accord with the lounge's policy, Anderson obtained defendant's fingerprints (R. 124:7,
19). Defendant was required to place two fingerprint identifications on the check because
the first fingerprint was unclear and could not be used as an identification (R. 124:18).
The second fingerprint is of defendant's right index finger (R. 124:18). Anderson then
cashed the check and gave the stated amount of money to defendant (R. 124:4).
Again in early April, 1997, defendant presented a second check at Bill's Lounge
and received cash in return (R. 124:51, 62). This check, numbered 18434 and also stolen
from Furst, was made out to defendant in excess of $1,300 (R. 124:35, 48, 58).
Anderson wrote defendant's Wyoming commercial driver's license number on the check
(R. 124:64). This time defendant satisfied the required fingerprint identification with a
print of his thumb (R. 124:64, 66).
Vern Beesley, a Deputy Sheriff assigned to the Crime Lab at the Salt Lake County
Sheriffs Office, testified that the fingerprints on the checks were those of defendant (R.
124:19,66).
As a result of Furst's stop payment order, neither check was paid and Bill's
Lounge suffered a loss of approximately $2660.00 (R. 124:5, 62).
Defendant had never worked for Furst and had never been issued a check by Furst
(R. 125:101; 124:58-59). He was not authorized to have either of the checks which he
5

cashed at Bill's Lounge (R. 125:101; 124:58-59). Further, checks from Furst could only
be signed by Furst's president, vice-president or the financial officer, and neither of the
checks defendant presented for payment were signed by any of these persons (R. 125:100;
124:58-59). The signature on check 18871, the check at issue, was a stamped signature
and was nor the stamped signature of any person authorized to sign the check (R. 125:
100). The signature on the second check was also not signed by an authorized person and
different from that on the first check (R. 124:58-59).
Defendant testified, identifying himself as a thirty-five-year-old self-employed
automobile mechanic who worked out of his home (R. 124:28). Although he made no
mention of it to anyone in law enforcement (R. 124:38), he testified that in March, 1997,
he met a Mike Workman through "a friend of a friend" (R. 124:29-30). Workman,
defendant claimed, requested that defendant replace the head gasket on a truck (R: 124:30,
39). Defendant recalled the truck being white, looking like a construction truck, with
signs on the doors and a box in the back, but did not recall what the signs said or if they
indicated "Furst Construction" (R. 124:29, 31). He testified that when he received check
number 18871 it was already filled out (R. 124:41). Workman's name was not anywhere
on the check (R. 124:45). Defendant had no records of any of the work he allegedly
performed for Workman (R. 39,44, 52). Notwithstanding his assertion that he innocently
assumed that Workman was an agent of Furst, that he had no knowledge that either check
was forged, and that he later tried to locate Workman, by the time of trial defendant had
6

still not attempted to locate Workman through those who had allegedly introduced
Workman to him (R. 124:37-39,45-46, 52).
Defendant claimed that a month after he had worked on the first truck, Workman
brought another pickup for an engine replacement (R. 124:47-48). This vehicle, however,
did not have signs on its side and did not appear to be a company vehicle. Nonetheless,
defendant accepted another Furst check, numbered 18434, in excess of $1300.00 (R.
124:48). This check was also stolen from Furst, bore an unauthorized signature, and was
not signed by Workman (R. 124:49, 58-59). When questioned about the amount,
defendant changed his testimony to add that Workman had brought in a "couple" of other
vehicles as well (R. 124:56-57). Defendant then recalled two to three other vehicles
which, in addition to the original truck, were paid for by the first check (R. 124:57).
Defendant testified that he received the checks a few weeks apart (R. 124:50). But
check number 18434, which defendant claimed he received a few weeks after receiving
the first check, was dated April 1, 1997 and was cashed on April 7, 1997 (R. 124:60).
The check at issue, check number 18771, dated April 2, 1997, was cashed on April 10,
1997 (R. 124:60). Also, defendant testified that he had never been to Bill's Lounge prior
to cashing check 18771 (R. 124:33, 52-53). However, check number 18434, cashed prior
to the check at issue, was also cashed at Bill's Lounge (R. 124:51, 53).
The jury found defendant guilty of forgery (R. 124:94).

7

SUMMARYOF ARGUMENT
POINT I
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss, which was made at
the close of the State's case and not later renewed. At the close of its case-in-chief, the
State had established that defendant had cashed a stolen, forged check from the payor
indicated on the check and that the payor had never employed defendant or issued him an
authorized check. Based on this evidence, the jury could reasonably have applied the
well-established inference that possession of a stolen instrument is prima facie evidence
of intent to defraud. Furthermore, the testimony of defendant and of the State's rebuttal
witnesses, introduced after defendant made his motion to dismiss, made even clearer that
the evidence of defendant's intent to defraud was not so sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds would have entertained a reasonable doubt
of defendant's guilt.
POINT II
The challenged jury instruction is substantially modeled on an instruction
approved not only by this court, but also by the United States Supreme Court and
correctly allows the jury to infer defendant's intent to defraud from the falsity of the
check defendant passed. The instruction implicitly acknowledges defendant's right to
offer evidence to explain his possession of a forged check, and expressly states that the
inference is merely permissive. Even if the instruction does not fully encompass the
8

State's burden in proving defendant's purpose to defraud, the instructions as a whole,
coupled with remarks of both the prosecutor and defense counsel, exhaustively explained
the required showing to the jury.
POINT III
The prosecutor's cross-examination did not constitute misconduct. In the first
alleged instance, defendant fails to show plain error where the prosecutor was prepared in
good faith to rebut defendant's testimony that he was not avoiding the police, but was
unable to produce the witness. In the second alleged instance, defendant fails to show
that the prosecutor's characterization of defendant's testimony was improper in the light
of all the evidence before the jury. Even if both claimed instances of misconduct were
error, they were harmless in light of much more prejudicial evidence properly admitted in
the course of cross-examination and the compelling evidence of defendant's guilt.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO DISMISS MADE AT THE END OF DEFENDANT'S CASE-INCHIEF BECAUSE THERE WAS EVIDENCE SHOWING
DEFENDANT CASHED A STOLEN, FORGED CHECK, EVIDENCE
SUFFICIENT TO INFER INTENT TO DEFRAUD
A.

The Standard of Review,

On a motion for a directed verdict, "the trial court should dismiss the charge if the
State did not establish a prima facie case against the defendant by producing 'believable

evidence of all the elements of the crime charged.'" State v. Adams, 955 P.2d 781, 787
(Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State v. Emmett. 839 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1992) (citations
omitted)). This Court will uphold a trial court's decision to submit a case to the jury if,
"upon reviewing the evidence and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it,
[the court] conclude[s] that some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find
that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v.
Davis. 965 P.2d 525, 535 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State v. Dibello. 780 P.3d 1221,
1225 (Utah 1989)). In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a trial court's
denial of a motion to dismiss or for directed verdict, "the record must be viewed in the
light most favorable to the State." State v. Thatcher. 108 Utah 63, 68 157 P.2d 258, 260
(1945). Further, review of the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss made after the
State's case-in-chief does not include evidence subsequently introduced by defendant.
State v. Tavlor. 818 P.2d 561, 573-74 (Utah App. 1991) (finding prima facie case based
on facts established at the close of the State's case-in-chief).1
B.

The State Presented Facts and Reasonable Inferences Drawn from
Those Facts From Which the Jury Could Have Found that Defendant
Committed Forgery Beyond a Reasonable Doubt,

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-501 (Supp. 1999), providing for forgery, states in pertinent

1

Defendant made a motion to dismiss the case at the close of the State's case-inchief, claiming that there was insufficient evidence of his intent to defraud (R. 124:22).
Defendant did not renew his motion at the close of all the evidence, nor on appeal has he
claimed a general insufficiency of evidence, limiting his claim only to the trial court's
denial of his motion. Br. of App. at 2, 9.
10

part, that ;*(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetuated by anyone, he . . . (b) makes,
completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, or utters any WTiting so
that the writing or the making, completion, execution, authentication, issuance,
transference, publication or utterance purports to be the act of another, whether the person
is existent or nonexistent

"

At the close of the State's case-in-chief, the State had

established that:
1. In the fall of 1996, checks were stolen from Furst. These checks were
from the 18,000 series (R. 125:97-98).
2.

Furst notified the police, advised the bank to stop payment on the entire
series and closed the account (R. 125:98-99).

3.

In the spring of 1997, defendant presented one of the stolen Furst
checks for payment at Bill's Lounge in Magna, Utah. (R. 125:97-99;
R. 124:9; State's Ex. 1). The check was made payable to defendant
and listed his address as a post office box in Gillette, Wyoming (R.
124:9).

4. Defendant presented a Wyoming driver's licence for identification. He
also supplied his social security number and placed two fingerprint
identifications on the check. The first fingerprint identification was
unclear, requiring defendant to place his fingerprint on the check
again before it could be cashed (R. 124:9-10, 18-19).
5.

The fingerprints on the check were those of the defendant (R. 124:19).

6.

Bill's Lounge cashed the check for defendant (R. 124:4).

7. Defendant accepted the money (R. 124:4).
8. Payment was stopped on the check. When Bill's Lounge called Furst
11

to discovery why, they were informed that the check had been stolen
(R. 124:5).
9. Defendant was not known to Furst, had never worked for Furst, had
never been issued a check from the company, and was not authorized
to have a check from Furst (R. 125:100-102).
10. The signature on the check was not the signature of any of the three
persons authorized to sign checks at Furst (R. 125:100).
Defendant argued only that because the State had not produced any evidence that
defendant either stole the check or knew that it was stolen, and by inference therefore
knew the check was false, the State had failed to show that he uttered the check with an
intent to defraud (R. 124:22-26).2 However, defendant's challenge falls short:
In a prosecution for uttering, as in the case forging an instrument, the
unexplained possession of a forged instrument that the defendant utters or
offers to utter gives rise to an inference that he either forged the instrument
or knew it to be forged, or to a presumption that he knew of the forger,
which presumption becomes conclusive in the absence of a reasonable
explanation.
36 Am. Jur. 2d Forgery § 44 ( ) .
This well-established doctrine, that a defendant's unexplained possession of a

2

On appeal, defendant additionally argues that although he passed ("uttered") the
stolen check, in doing so he "purported" to act only for himself, and so the State failed to
show that his passing the check was "purportedly the act of another" thereby suggesting
that the State's proof also lacks an actus reus.." Br. of App. at 11-12. However,
defendant did not challenge this alleged failure of the State's proof at trial, and so this
argument has not been preserved for appeal. See State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 654
(Utah App. 1997) (declining to consider claim first raised on appeal). Further, defendant
misapprehends that the actus reus element of the forgery statute, to wit: that the actor
"makes . . . or utters any writing so that the writing . . . purports to be the act of another,"
refers in this case to defendant's uttering a check purporting to be an act of Furst, not
himself. This distinction is clearly made in the elements instruction, which defendant
also did not challenge in the trial court and has not challenged on appeal (See jury
instruction #19).

12

forged instrument which he also utters gives rise to the inference that he knew the
instrument to be forged, has long standing in Utah. In State v. Lanos. 63 Utah 151,155,
223 P. 1065, 1066 (1924), the defendant challenged the admissibility of other forged
checks offered by the prosecution to show an intent to defraud. The court found
"untenable" the defendant's claim that such evidence was incompetent "unless it is also
shown that the defendant had guilty knowledge of the falsity of the instruments when they
were passed by him," stating:
"The falsity of the other articles (forged or counterfeit) uttered or possessed
must of course be shown. But the defendant's knowledge of their falsity
need not be shown. The very kernel of the principle (either knowledge or
intent) is that the fact of the uttering tends, in one way or another, to show
the defendant's knowledge at the time in issue, either by the probable
warning received, or by the improbability of innocent intent in repeated
instances; and the assumption throughout is that the bare fact of utterance
shows this." [Emphasis added.]
Id., 223 P. at 1066-67 (quoting 1 Wigmore on Evidence § 317 (2nd ed.), and citing with
approval Underbill's Criminal Evidence § 629 (3rd ed.), 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence §
35 (10th ed.) and 2 Wharton Criminal Law § 920 (11th ed.)).
The Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed Utah's long-standing acceptance of the guilty
inference recognized in Lanos in State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220 (Utah 1985). In
Williams, the defendant, convicted of forgery, gave a check in payment for a car repair.
Id., 712 P.2d at 221. As in this case, the State presented evidence that the check had been
stolen from the repair shop owner's home office, that the owner did not know defendant,
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had never employed him, did not owe him money and that he had not written the check
nor authorized anyone to do so. Id at 223. Noting that the ff [defendant presented no
evidence to controvert the logical inferences which could be drawn by the jury, i.e., that
without any explanation as to where he got the check or from whom, the defendant knew
the check was forged," the court rejected a claim of insufficient evidence, holding that
"[t]he evidence against defendant was not so inherently improbable that it would
necessitate a reasonable doubt in the minds of reasonable persons as to his guilt." Id.3
In denying defendant's motions at the close of the State's case-in-chief, the trial
court noted: "You have a victim. You have a benefit conferred, and a trier of fact could
conclude from those facts that the defendant either stole the check and had somebody fill
it out and he cashed it, or someone stole the check and filled it out. And the defendant
cashed it for part or all of the proceeds" (R. 124:26). Thus, although its expression of the

3

The inference applied in Lanos and Williams has also been recognized in other
jurisdictions. See, eg,, State v. DeGina. 256 S.E.2d 275, 278 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979)
("[W]e hold that the inference that one who utters a forged instrument and thereby
endeavors to obtain money or advances upon it either forged or consented to the forging
of the instrument is not violative of due process."); Snider v. State, 108 P.2d 552, 557
(Okla. Crim. App. 1940) ("If the state proves passing of a forged instrument, the intent to
defraud in many instances may be inferred from the act of uttering such an instrument");
State v. Woods, 206 S.E.2d 509, 514-15 (W. Va. 1974) (finding proper jury instruction
which stated "unexplained possession of a forged instrument by one who endeavors to
obtain money thereon is prima facie evidence that such person forged the instrument").
Moreover, the validity of the inference is attested to by its application by Utah's appellate
courts to other offenses which, like forgery, must frequently be proven by circumstantial
evidence; for example, possession of recently stolen property without a satisfactory
explanation for the possession is prima facie evidence that the person in possession stole
the property. See State v. Graves, 717 P.2d 717, 717-18 (Utah 1986) (upholding guilty
verdict when defendant failed to present any explanation to his possession of stolen
vehicle); State v. Davis. 965 P.2d 525, 536 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (inference of
knowledge that property stolen proper when no plausible explanation is offered).
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time-honored inference is somewhat abbreviated, trial court correct!}* recognized that
from defendant's passing a forged, stolen check, the jury could reasonably infer that
defendant knew that it was false and passed it with intent to defraud.
In sum, at the close of the State's case-in-chief, the prosecution had proven that
defendant had cashed a stolen, forged check from Furst and that Furst had never
employed defendant or issued him an authorized check. At this point in the trial, the
evidence and the reasonable inference of defendant's intent to defraud was not so
"sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt." See Williams, 712 P.2d at 223 (citing State v. Petree,
659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)). Therefore, the trial court correctly denied the motion to
dismiss.
As authority for his opposing claim, defendant cites two Texas cases, which
happen to reject the inference that has already been approved in Utah. See Parks v. State,
746 S.W.2d 738, 740 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), and Albrecht v. State. 486 S.W.2d 97, 102
(Tex.Ct.App. 1972).
Defendant also cites State v. Castonguay. 663 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Utah 1983), for
the proposition that the State must eliminate any other reasonable alternative hypothesis
in proving the requisite intent for the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Br. of
App. at 13-14. However, the facts and procedural circumstances that led the court in
Castonguay to apply the alternative reasonable hypothesis doctrine are very different than
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in this case. In Castonguay. the defendant was convicted of attempted first degree murder
for firing his rifle at a police officer. Id. at 1324-25. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court
agreed with defendant that there was insufficient evidence of his intent to kill the officer
in order to avoid arrest to support the conviction. Id. at 1326-27. However, the court
supported this conclusion with facts adduced by both the prosecution and the defense, i.e.,
the entire body of evidence presented to the trier of fact, which clearly indicated that if
the defendant had intended to kill the officer he could surely have done so. L± In the
instant case, by contrast, defendant moved for a dismissal at the end of the State's casein-chief, when only evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer his intent to
defraud had been presented, and before he testified to any alternative theory for his
possessing the stolen check (R. 124:22).4 In short, a trial court is governed by the
rebuttable presumption of guilty intent where the defendant has unexplained possession
of stolen documents, and so cannot be required to grant a motion to dismiss where there is
no evidence in support of some reasonable alternative hypothesis, especially in the face of

4

As noted earlier in this discussion, see Br. of Appellee at PtIA, only evidence
presented at the time of the motion to dismiss is relevant to evaluating defendant's
motion. See Taylor,
818 P.2d at. See also Nguyen v. State, 580 So. 2d 122, 122-23 (Ala
Ct. App. 1991) (n[W]here the sufficiency of the evidence is tested by a motion for a
judgment of acquittal, we may examine only that evidence which was before the court at
the time the motion was made.") (citation omitted); State v. Hartman, 270 S.E.2d 609,
611,613 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980) (considering only evidence introduced in state's case-inchief in determining motion to dismiss made at the close of the state's evidence, even
though defendant later offered evidence of police entrapment). Thus, defendant's
reference, with statutory citations, to his being a holder in due course, see Br. of App. at
12, which was the entire theory of the defense and only presented when he testified
following his motion to dismiss, is improper.
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so well-established an inference of guilty knowledge as in the torgery context.5
Even if evidence developed following defendant's motion to dismiss were
considered by this Court, it becomes still clearer that there was sufficient evidence to
support defendant's conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, for defendant's theory was
untenable and his credibility doubtful. Following defendant's testimony and the State's
rebuttal, the jury learned the following additional incriminating facts:
1. Although defendant gave a Wyoming driver's license listing a
Wyoming post office box as his mailing address, defendant had not
lived in Wyoming for more than five years (R. 124:42).
2. Defendant received another Furst check, numbered 18434, made out
one day before the check from which the criminal charge stemmed,
which he also cashed at Bill's Lounge (R. 124: 51, 62).
3. The check numbered 18434 was also stolen from Furst, bore an
unauthorized signature different from that on the first check, was
made out in an amount in excess of $1300, and also returned unpaid
(R. 124:35,48,58-59,62).

4. Defendant used his thumb, rather than his indexfinger,to provide the
requested fingerprint for Bill's Lounge (R. 124:64, 66).
5. Defendant testified that he is a thirty-five year-old automobile
mechanic who worked out of his home (R. 124:28). He claimed to
have received both checks from a "Mike Workman" who brought a
few vehicles to him for repair (R. 124:29-30,47-48). However,
Workman's name was not anywhere on either check (R. 124:45,
State's Ex. 1).
5

The Utah Supreme Court has granted the State's petition for writ of certiorari,
challenging this Court's recent application of the "alternative reasonable hypothesis"
doctrine in State v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782 (Utah App. 1998), cert, granted, _ P.2d _
(Utah, Aug. 11, 1998), which will be argued on April 6, 1999.
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6. Defendant also admitted providing an incorrect spelling to a Mike
Workman, the individual from whom defendant allegedly received
the check (R. 124:43-44).
These facts, and particularly defendant's passing a second check within, at most, a
few days, in conjunction with the facts developed in the State's case-in-chief clearly
indicate that defendant was aware that check numbered 18771 was not genuine. See
State v. Green. 89 Utah 437, 452-53, 57 P.2d 750, 757 (1936) ("The inference of criminal
or felonious intent arises from the repetition of instances, since the probability of innocent
intent is minimized by each additional similar act.").
Furthermore, defendant undermined his own credibility, and thereby further
incriminated himself. See State v. John. 586 P.2d 410, 412 (Utah 1978) (noting where
defendant presents alternative hypothesis that conflicts with State's evidence, jurors "are
the exclusive judges of the credibility of the evidence" and thus may reject hypothesis
lacking in "substantial and credible evidence.") (cited with approval in Layman, 953 P.2d
at 787 n.4). First, defendant claimed that he had never been to Bill's Lounge prior to
cashing the check at issue; however, the second check was paid on April 7, while the
check at issue was paid on April 10 (R. 124:33, 52-53, 60). Further, defendant claimed
he received the checks a "couple of weeks apart;" however, as just noted, the checks were
paid three days apart (R. 124:47, 52, 60). Additionally, defendant claimed the check was
in payment for work on a construction-like truck; however, when confronted with the fact
that he received over $2600 within approximately three days, defendant changed his
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testimony to say that the check at issue was payment for the truck plus one or two other
cars and the second check was payment for another truck altogether (R. 124: 30, 56-57).
Also, although defendant claimed the checks were for payment for automotive work, he
could not produce any records of the transactions (R. 124:39,44,52). Most significantly,
defendant claimed to have looked for Workman after defendant allegedly performed work
for him, but failed to utilize the most obvious source, to wit: the "friends" who
purportedly had introduced Workman to him, persons who also remained unnamed (R.
124:37, 39).
Finally, the jury was instructed that in convicting defendant "the evidence must, in
your minds, exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the
defendant" (jury instruction #14, R. 78). In sum, even considering defendant's asserted
reasonable alternative hypothesis, the evidence as a whole shows that there was sufficient
evidence to support defendant's conviction.
POINT II
THE CHALLENGED INSTRUCTION STATED AN ALLOWABLE
INFERENCE WHICH, TAKEN IN CONTEXT OF THE
INSTRUCTIONS AS A WHOLE AND IN LIGHT OF COUNSEL'S
REMARKS, FULLY EXPLAINED THE STATE'S BURDEN TO
PROVE THAT DEFENDANT PASSED A CHECK WITH
KNOWLEDGE OF ITS FALSITY
Defendant claims jury instruction #22 improperly directed the jury to infer his
intent to defraud from the mere fact that check numbered 18771 was forged, thereby
relieving the jury of its burden of finding his criminal intent beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Br. of App. at 15-17. He further claims that he was prejudiced because the prosecution
failed to show that he actually knew that the check was false. Br. of App. at 18.
However, the challenged instruction is a correct and well-established statement of a
permissible inference, especially where numerous instructions clearly required the jury to
find actual intent to defraud before it rendered a guilty verdict and both the prosecutor's
and defense counsel's closing arguments emphasized that actual intent was required.
A.

The Standard of Review,

In State v. Lucero. 866 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1993), this Court outlined the standard
of review applied to a challenged jury instruction:
A challenge to a jury instruction as incorrectly stating the law presents a
question of law, which we review for correctness." State v. Archuleta, 850
P.2d 1232, 1244 (Utah), cert, denied. 510 U.S. 979 (1993). Jury instructions
must be read and evaluated as a whole. State v. Johnson. 774 P.2d 1141,
1146 (Utah 1989). They must accurately and adequately inform a criminal
jury as to the basic elements of the crime charged. State v. Roberts, 711
P.2d 235, 239 (Utah 1985). However, if taken as a whole they fairly instruct
the jury on the law applicable to the case, the fact that one of the
instructions, standing alone, is not as accurate as it might have been is not
reversible error. State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 542 (Utah 1981); State v.
Tennvson. 850 P.2d 461, 470 (Utah App. 1993).
Id at 3; see also State v. Larsen, 876 P.2d 391, 396 (Utah App. 1994).
"Jury instructions are to be considered and construed as a whole and reconciled
whenever possible; conversely, they are not to be considered in isolation in order to
predicate a claim of error.... It is presumed that the jury read and followed all of the
court's instructions." State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 81 (Utah 1981) (Hall, J., dissenting).
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A reviewing court will "reverse a trial court's decision on the basis of an
instruction improperly submitted to the jury only where the party challenging the
propriety of the instruction 'demonstrates prejudice stemming from the instructions
viewed in the aggregate.,M Salt Lake City v. Smoot 921 P.2d 1003, 1006 (Utah App.)
(quoting State v. Haston. 811 P.2d929, 931 (Utah App. 199IX rev'd on other grounds,
846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993)1 cert, denied. 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996).
B.

Taking the Instructions as a Whole, Instruction 22
Adequately Instructs on the Element of Intent

Instruction 22 states:
Intent to defraud is simply a purpose to use a false writing as if it
were genuine in order to gain some advantage.
A false writing has such an obvious tendency to accomplish fraud
that you may infer such intent from the mere creation of an instrument that
is false.
(R. 102).
Defendant argues that this instruction relieves the jury of its burden tofindthat
defendant passed the check with criminal intent. However, as discussed at Point I of this
brief, the instruction plainly expresses a time-honored inference in the law. In Barnes v.
United States, 412 U.S. 837, 93 S. Ct. 2357 (1973), the defendant, convicted of uttering
stolen checks, challenged the following jury instruction (as it was summarized by the
Court):
[Possession of recently stolen property, if not satisfactorily explained, is
ordinarily a circumstance from which you may reasonably draw the
inference and find, in light of the surrounding circumstances shown by the
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evidence in the case, that the person in possession knew the property had
been stolen.
kL at 840, 93 S. Ct. at 2360. Supporting the instruction's constitutionality, the Court
noted that "the challenged instruction only permitted the inference of guilt from
unexplained possession of recently stolen property." Id. at 844-45, 93 S. Ct. at 2362
(emphasis in original). However, the Court went on to say:
Of course, the mere fact that there is some evidence tending to explain a
defendant's possession consistent with innocence does not bar instructing
the jury on the inference. The jury must weigh the explanation to determine
whether it is "satisfactory."... The jury is not bound to accept the
correctness of the inference. [Emphasis added.]
I d at 844 n.9, 93 S. Ct. at 2362 n.9. See also State v. Carlson. 934 P.2d 657, 659-60
(Utah App. 1997) (approving comparable jury instruction and citing Barnes with
approval).
Although jury instruction #22 did not contain the phrase, "if not satisfactorily
explained," the import of that phrase is implicit in the instruction, for to maintain
otherwise would be to nullify the common sense understanding that a criminal defense
necessarily allows the explaining of one's conduct. Furthermore, if this common sense
notion was not implicit in the instruction, then the language making the inference merely
permissive, to wit: " . . . you may infer such intent from the mere creation of an instrument
that is false," would be meaningless. In other words, as Barnes observed, the instruction
gives the jury the freedom to reject the inference based on the evidence. See State v.
Gray. 851 P.2d 1217, 1227 (Utah App. 1993) (finding proper jury instruction embracing
22

inference of criminal intent from possession of stolen property where the inference was
only permissive). However, even if this Court concluded that the plain language of the
instruction did not encompass the State's interpretation, it is apparent that the jury
properly instructed.
The law is well established that a jury instruction is not viewed in isolation from
the charge as a whole. See Larsen, 876 P.2d at 396-97 (finding no error in the elements
instruction which substituted the statutory term, "purpose to deprive," for "intent,"
particularly where five other instructions properly equated the two terms and stated the
necessity of intent in proving criminal conduct); Lucero, 866 P.2d at 3 (recognizing that
one part of the challenged instruction might be confusing viewed in isolation, but when
considered with another instruction clarifying the confusing reference to intent, the
instructions as a whole were neither inadequate nor misleading); accord State v. Dock.
585 P.2d 56, 57 (Utah 1978) (harmless error for elements jury instruction to omit
statutory requirement of assault, i.e., "intending to commit bodily injury," where other
jury instructions defined and referenced statutory intent requirement).
Rather than standing alone, instruction 22 is imbedded among thirteen other
relevant instructions, including an elements instruction which defendant does not
challenge on appeal. These instructions collectively define intent, instruct that intent is a
necessary element of the charged offense, suggest how intent may by proven, place intent
in the context of an actual, fact-based purpose to defraud, and urge the jury not to single
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out any jury instruction, but to consider the instructions as a whole. Specifically, the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence as to every
element of the offense, including an intent to defraud, is collectively discussed in the
following instructions:
#3 - "State has burden of proving each and all of the essential allegations
thereof to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt" (R. 66);
#5 - "The law forbids you to be governed by mere conjecture

" (R. 68);

#7 - "[Y]ou should carefully and conscientiously consider and compare all
of the testimony, and all of the facts and circumstances which have a
bearing on any issue, and determine therefrom what the facts are"
(R.71);
#8 - "You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight of the evidence.") (R. 72);

#12 - "All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in favor of
innocence, and a defendant is presumed innocent until he is proven
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt" (R. 76);
#13 - "An act committed or an omission made under an ignorance or
mistake of fact which disproves the culpable mental state is a defense
for that crime. Thus a person is not guilty of a crime if he commits
an act or omits to act under an honest and reasonable belief in the
existence of certain facts and circumstances which, if true, would
make such an act or omission lawful" (R.77) [Emphasis added.];
#14 - "To warrant you in convicting the defendant, the evidence must, to your
minds, exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than that of the guilt
of the defendant. That is to say, if after an entire consideration and
comparison of all the testimony in the case you can reasonably explain
the facts given in evidence on any reasonable ground other than the
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guilt of the defendant, you must acquit him (R. 78) [Emphasis added.];
#15 - "Intent, being a state of mind, is seldom susceptible of proof by direct
and evidence and may ordinarily be inferred from acts, conduct,
statements and circumstances" (R. 79) [Emphasis added.];
#17 - 'To constitute the crime in the information there must be the joint
operation of two essential elements: conduct prohibited by law and
the appropriate culpable mental state or states with regard to the
conduct prohibited by law. Before a defendant may be found
guilty of a crime, the evidence must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant... committed such conduct with the
culpable mental state required for such offense (R. 81) [Emphasis
added.];
#19 - "Before you can convict the defendant. Alan Kilstrom [sic] of
the offense of Forgery as charged in the information, you must
find from all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt each
and every one of the following elements of that offense:....
(5) That the said defendant then and there knew the writing was
not the act of First [sic] Construction Company . . . : and
(6) That the said defendant then and there had a purpose to defraud.
If after careful consideration of all the evidence in this case, you are
convinced of the truth of each and every one of the foregoing
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant
guilty of Forgery as charged in the information. If on the other hand,
you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more
of the foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not
guilty (R. 83) [Emphasis added.];
#20 - "A 'purpose to defraud' is an intent to deceive another for the purpose
of gaining some material advantage over him or to induce him to part
with property, and to accomplish that purpose by some false statement,
false pretense, or by any other artifice or act designed to deceive.
(R. 84) [Emphasis added.];
#24 - "If in these instructions any rule, direction or idea has been stated in
various ways, no emphasis thereon is intended, and none must be
inferred by you. For that reason, you are not to single out any certain
sentence, or any individual point or instruction, and ignore the others.
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but you are to consider all the instructions as a whole, and to regard
each in the light of the others (R. 88) [Emphasis added.]; and
#25 - "If an instruction applies only to a state of facts which you find does
not exist, you will disregard the instruction (R. 89).
These instructions repeatedly condition the jury's determination of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt on its consideration of all the evidence in the case and its express
finding that defendant had the required mental state to defraud by knowingly passing a
check he knew was not authorized by Furst. In the face of such a focused and weighty
directive, and particularly in light of the trial court's instruction to consider all the
instructions in the light of the others, it is unreasonable to believe that the jury singled out
instruction #22 to relieve itself of the duty to determine from the evidence whether
defendant actually had a purpose to defraud in passing the check.
Moreover, the arguments of counsel further directed the jury to the requirements of
the law. In closing, the prosecutor read jury instruction #22 to the jury (R. 124:72).
However, the prosecutor then immediately stated, "Well, I don't think you have to rely
just on the fact that these documents were submitted. I think there's a number of other
things in the case that tell you that the defendant knew he was dealing with forged
documents when he presented these checks" (R. 72). The prosecutor then reviewed for
the jury evidence proving defendant's guilty knowledge (R. 72-77). Similarly, in opening
statement defense counsel warned the jury that in order to prove intent to defraud the
prosecution was required to show that defendant presented the check knowing it was not
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genuine (R. 125: 92-93). Counsel began her closing argument with that same central
theme, which she returned to repeatedly (R. 124:87, 88).:
Ladies and gentleman of the jury, you can't be guilty of forgery if
you don't know the check that you're trying to cash is forged or stolen or
that there's something wrong with it. [The prosecutor] used the word
"bogus." That's right. You have to know it's a bogus check and be trying
to trick somebody into cashing a bogus check for you. Alan's not guilty
because he didn't know it was a bogus check, and he didn't have any reason
to know it was a bogus check.
(R. 124:77). In response, the prosecutor repeatedly accepted the burden of actually
showing that defendant knew the check was not genuine (R. 124:88, 92- 93).
In sum, even if this Court found jury instruction #22 did not correctly set out the
State's burden of proof with respect to defendant' intent to defraud, the instructions as
whole, coupled with both the prosecutor's and defense counsel's remarks, correctly
instructed the jury on the required showing of criminal intent.
POINT III
DEFENDANT FAILS TO SHOW THAT THE PROSECUTOR'S
SUGGESTION THAT HE WAS AVOIDING THE POLICE OR HAD
TESTIFIED FALSELY CONSTITUTES MISCONDUCT AND THAT
SUCH CROSS-EXAMINATION WAS PREJUDICIAL
A.

The Standard of Review,

"The test for determining whether a prosecutor's statements at trial constitute error
is whether the remarks 'called to the jurors' attention matters which they would not be
justified in considering in reaching a verdict.'" State v. Taylor, 884 P.2d 1293, 1296
(Utah App. 1994)(citation omitted). "Only if the improper statements are deemed to be
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harmful will they require reversal." Id, (citation omitted).
However, in establishing a claim for prosecutorial misconduct, the defense must
first preserve the issue in the record. "Failure to object to improper remarks will constitute
a waiver of the claim unless the remarks constitute plain error." See State v. Emmett 839
P.2d 781, 785 (Utah 1992); State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 342 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Plain error is found if the court concludes: "an error exists, it should have been obvious to
the trial court, and it was harmful." Palmer, 860 P.2d at 342. A harmful error is one
which "undermines [the court's] confidence in the verdict or,... there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome without the error." Id. (citations omitted).
However, in State v. Young, the court held that " when there is strong proof of guilt, the
conduct or remark of a prosecutor is not presumed prejudicial. 853 P.2d 327, 349 (Utah
1993).
B.

Defendant Fails to Establish Plain Error in the Prosecutor's
Unsupported Suggestion that Defendant was Avoiding the Police,

In the first instance of alleged misconduct, defendant claims that the State
introduced unsupported innuendo when the prosecutor questioned him about Detective
Townsend's efforts to contact him about the fraudulent check:
Q[Pr]: Okay. When did you realize that the police were looking for you in
connection with this check?
A[Df]:When I did - -1 didn't know anything about this until I was arrested
on a different warrant.
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Q:

Well, on this particular case weren't you aware in late May or early
June that Detective Doug Townsend wanted to talk to you in
connection with this check?

A:

No.

Q:

He didn't go to your house? Weren't you living with a young
woman at the time, a Jenny, is it Tangloon?

A:

Tangloon. No, I wasn't, not at that time.

Q:

She didn't tell Officer Townsend that they were looking for you in
late May or early June?
I haven't talked to her for over a year.

A:
Q:

Well, where were you in late May or early June? Were you out of
state or in state?

A:

I was in state.

Q:

You were here. Were you ever trying to hide from the police in
connection with this case?

A:

Not at all.

Q:

And you say you never learned about the check until when?

A:

December.

Q:

December of 1997?

A:

Yes, sir.

(R. 124:40-41).
Because defendant failed to object to the prosecutor's questioning, defendant's
claim must be examined under the plain error doctrine, i.e., showing of obvious, harmful
error. Admittedly, the prosecutor failed to introduce evidence to rebut defendant's
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assertion that he was unaware of police efforts to contact him. However, that failure does
not constitute misconduct in this case.
First, the prosecutor's questions to defendant were evidently not posed in bad faith.
See State v. Peterson. 722 P.2d 768, 769-80 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (implying that
prosecutor's lack of good faith in Unsupported innuendo is significant in determining
misconduct). Moreover, the questioning was not "egregious," sufficient to dispense with
the "obviousness" requirement. See Palmer, 860 P.2d at 343 (dispensing with
obviousness requirement because the prosecutor's repeated, unsupported innuendo that
the child sex abuse defendant had admitted to the victim's stepfather "inappropriate
feelings" toward the victim was so "egregious").
In this case, the prosecutor was prepared to call Detective Townsend at the very
outset of trial, stating, "And we have one other witness, Doug Townsend, who is not here.
He is also employed with the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office" (R. 125:50). Thus, the
trial court, as well as the parties, reasonably expected Detective Townsend to appear.
Moreover, since Detective Townsend had investigated the case (R. 4-5), it seems
reasonable that the prosecutor intended his appearance for the very purpose of supporting
his suggestion that defendant was avoiding police contact. However, for unexplained
reasons, Detective Townsend did not appear.
Even if the prosecutor's cross-examination was obvious error, it plainly was not
harmful. First, defendant prejudiced himself when, in response to the prosecutor's
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suggestion that defendant knew the police were looking for him in connection with the
check, he said, MI didn't know anything about this until I was arrested on a different
warrant" (R. 124:40). Further, and particularly in the face of defendant's own damaging
admission, the total effect of the prosecutor's unsupported suggestion was not prejudicial.
See Palmer, 860 P.2d at 350 (recognizing that no individual error among the prosecutor's
multiple instances of misconduct, including unsupported innuendo, were prejudicial).
Further, to the extent that the prosecutor's suggestion was unsupported by evidence, its
prejudicial effect was mitigated by jury instructions instructing the jury to consider only
the evidence actually introduced at trial.6 Finally, as argued at Point IB above, the
evidence showed that defendant cashed two forged checks within a few days in
circumstances which clearly indicated defendant's knowledge that the check were not
genuine, all of which evidence was lent greater weight by defendant's doubtful credibility
about how he had obtained the checks. In sum, unlike State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 486-87
(Utah 1984), the evidence in this case was sufficiently compelling to dispel any concern

6

Jury instruction #5 stated: "You are to be governed solely by the evidence
introduced in this trial and the law as stated to you by [the court]. The law forbids you to
be governed by mere conjecture . . . . " (R. 68). Jury instruction #16 instructed the jury
that it "should not consider as evidence any statement of counsel made during the trial,
unless such statement was made as a stipulation conceding the existence of a fact or facts"
(R. 80). See also State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 349 (Utah 1993) (finding that
prosecutions remarks about evidence not introduced at trial not prejudicial when
considered in context of evidence presented at trial and instructions to the jury); Peterson.
722 P.2d at 770 (holding that in conviction for burglary, evidence presented at trial and
jury instructions advising that statements of counsel were not evidence alleviated
prosecutorial misconduct in unsubstantiated introduction of defendant's prior felony
convictions).
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that absent the prosecutor's remark there would have been a different result.
C.

Defendant Fails to Show Misconduct in Prosecutor's CrossExamination About the Number of Checks He Claimed to
Have Received from Workman.

Defendant also claims that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct when,
in cross-examining him about his prior dealings with Workman and the circumstances of
his receiving the check, the prosecutor mischaracterized defendant's prior testimony and
suggested that defendant was a liar. Br. of App. at 19-22. Defendant relies on the
following cross-examination:
Q:

How many times did this man pay you?

A:

How many times? He paid me - -

Ms. Remal [Defense counsel]:

Objection, Your Honor.

(R. 124:47). The court overruled defendant's objection and the prosecutor continued his
line of questioning:
Q:

How many times did Mike Workman pay you?

A:

Two times.

Q:

Two times?

A:

Yes.

Q:

Didn't you just tell the jury it was only one time?

A:

No.

(R. 124:47). Defendant's counsel objected once more, claiming that the prosecutor was
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mischaracterizing the evidence. Once again the court overruled the objection. The State
properly continued it's questioning:
Q:

Didn't you just a few minutes ago tell us that that was the only time
he ever paid you?

A:

No, I didn't.

Q:

So now he did pay you twice?

A:

Yeah.

(R. 124:47).
The State acknowledges that defendant had not expressly testified that he was paid
by Workman only once, as the prosecutor's questioning suggested. However, in the
context of all the testimony, the suggestion is not clearly improper. Defendant testified
for the first time on cross-examination that he had received two checks from Workman
(R. 124:47). However, prior to that testimony, there was no evidence before the jury
suggesting that defendant had passed more than one bad check. Indeed, the obvious
theory of the defense was to show defendant's innocent state of mind by his limited
dealings with Workman and Bill's Lounge, both of whom he claimed not to had any
dealings prior to this incident, and his naive acceptance of the one check at issue (R.
124:32-37, 41-46). Thus, the prosecutor's challenge was an understandable response to
not only the general character of the defense, but also to the statement defendant had
made just moments before, indicating that defendant had not previously met Workman
(R. 124:46).
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However, even if the prosecutor's statement was an erroneous mischaracterization
of defendant's prior testimony, defendant was not prejudiced. First, any
mischaracterization of the number of checks defendant had received would have been
immediately apparent to the jury who had heard defendant's testimony. More
importantly, the real prejudice stemmed not from any mischaracterization, but from the
inevitable revelation that defendant had passed a second, forged, unauthorized, stolen
check, the existence of which came to light immediately after the challenged crossexamination (R. 124:47-53). Indeed, it is obvious that the prosecutor's asserted
mischaracterization is nothing but a bridge to the proper, unchallenged introduction of
much more damaging information. See Taylor. 884 P.2d at 1298 (no prosecutorial
misconduct where the defendant subsequently admits prejudicial fact). Coupled with
instructions (R. 68, 80) directing the jury to consider only the evidence and the
compelling evidence of defendant's guilt, any error by the prosecutor was harmless.7

7

Because jury instruction #22 does not misstate the law and defendant's claims of
prosecutorial misconduct are without merit, it is unnecessary for the State to address
defendant's claim of cumulative error. Br. of App. at 22-23.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that defendant's
conviction be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this £

day of March, 1999.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
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